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Assay to Detect
H5N1 Oseltamivir
Resistance 
To the Editor: Oseltamivir is a
neuraminidase inhibitor approved for
treatment and prevention of influenza
virus infection. Oseltamivir resistance
caused by a single amino acid substi-
tution from histidine (H) to tyrosine
(Y) at position 274 of the neu-
raminidase active site has been report-
ed in persons infected both experi-
mentally and naturally with influenza
Avirus subtype H5N1 (1,2). Evidence
suggests that using lower doses of
oseltamivir or shorter-than-recom-
mended treatment periods can con-
tribute to emergence of viral resist-
ance (1,3) Currently, oseltamivir is
being used in several countries that
may be affected by epidemics of
H5N1. Therefore, monitoring for
oseltamivir-resistant strains of H5N1
during oseltamivir administration is
essential for outbreak management
and prevention.
Although real-time PCR or
pyrosequencing is more rapid than
high-throughput assays for mutation
detection (4,5), the conventional PCR
technique can be applied to detect
drug-resistant mutation (6) in areas
lacking real-time PCR or pyrose-
quencing capabilities. Therefore, to
discriminate between oseltamivir-
sensitive and oseltamivir-resistant
strains, we developed a simple
method, based on PCR, which takes
advantage of the H274Y substitution.
The forward primer was designed
from the conserved region common to
both wild-type and mutant strains; the
reverse primers were designed specif-
ically for wild-type and mutant
strains, respectively, derived from the
3′ terminal base of each primer. The
primers consisted of a forward primer
N1f (nt 517-534: 5′-GGGGCTGTG-
GCTGTATTG-3′) and reverse primer
H274r (nt 759-784: 5′-GGATAA-
CAGGAGCAYTCCTCATAGTG -3′)
for wild-type strain detection or
Y274r (nt 759-784: 5′-GGATAACA-
GGAGCAYTCCTCATAGTA-3′) for
mutant strain detection. (Note: Under-
lined letters represent differences in
nucleotides between plus vs. minus
primers.) Both strains yielded prod-
ucts of ≈267 bp; hence, the assay con-
sisted of 2 separate reactions for
detecting wild-type and mutant
strains, respectively.
For each reaction, 1.0 µL cDNA
was combined with a reaction mixture
that contained 10 µL 2.5× MasterMix
(Eppendorf, Hamburg, Germany), for-
ward and reverse primers at a final
concentration of 0.15 µM, and nucle-
ase-free water to a final volume of 20
µL. Thermocycling conditions com-
prised initial denaturation at 94°C for
3 min and 35 cycles of amplification
including denaturation (94°C, 30 s),
annealing (65°C, 50 s), extension
(72°C, 45 s), and final extension
(72°C, 7 min). Subsequently, 10 µL
of the amplified products was ana-
lyzed by using 2% agarose gel
electrophoresis.
To optimize the assay, we per-
formed PCR-based H274Ymutagene-
sis of the N1 fragment of the H5N1
virus (primers on request). The result-
ing mutagenic and wild-type products
were cloned into the pGEM-T Easy
Vectors (Promega, Madison, WI,
USA), confirmed by direct sequenc-
ing, and then used as positive con-
trols. Preliminary results showed that
the wild-type primer was specific for
the oseltamivir-sensitive strain,
whereas the mutant primer can be
used to detect the oseltamivir-resistant
strain exclusively because no signifi-
cant cross-amplification had been
observed.
To establish sensitivity, serial 10-
fold dilutions of the standard N1 plas-
mids (wild-type and mutant) ranging
from 109 to 101 copies/µL were used
as a template. The threshold concen-
trations for detection of wild-types
and mutants were 103 copies/µL. To
provide semiquantitative data to
detect subpopulations of the resistant
variants, the 2 control plasmids were
mixed at wild-type:variant ratios of
108:102, 107:103, 106:104, 105:105, 104:
106, 103:107, and 102:108. The result
showed that the density of the expect-
ed bands depended on the amount of
DNA templates (Figure B). However,
the mixing experiments indicated that
the predominant mixtures of wild-
type:resistant variant were 80:20,
which is the lowest ratio of resistant
variants that the assay can reliably
detect (data not shown). To assess
specificity, human DNA and viral
cDNA extracted from other subtypes
of influenza A virus (N2–N9) were
subjected to this assay. No cross-reac-
tion occurred with human DNA or
other subtypes of influenza A virus.
We further validated the assay by
testing 3 specimens from hosts treat-
ed with oseltamivir and 17 specimens
from untreated hosts; infection with
H5N1 was detected by using multi-
plex real-time PCR (7). The speci-
mens from oseltamivir recipients
were isolated from a Vietnamese
patient on the third day after he
received a prophylactic dose (1) and
from 2 tigers (CU-T7 and KU-11) (8).
The specimens from untreated hosts
were isolated from the plasma of an
H5N1-infected human (9) and from
virus-containing allantoic fluid iso-
lated from infected chickens, ducks,
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and cats (n = 16) during a 2005 out-
break in Thailand. The specimen iso-
lated from the Vietnamese patient
yielded detectable bands after ampli-
fication by wild-type and mutant
primer sets, which indicates that this
specimen contains mixed populations
of wild-type and resistant strains
(Figure, A). The result was confirmed
by cloning the amplicon of the
Vietnamese strain into the pGEM-T
EASY vector (Promega). Ten
colonies were randomly picked and
sequenced; 9 clones were mutant, and
1 was wild type. The other specimens
produced a visible positive band only
on amplification using the wild-type
primer set, which indicates that sam-
ples containing these strains were
oseltamivir sensitive.
The assay described here provides
an accurate, cost-effective, and highly
efficient approach to detecting
oseltamivir-sensitive and oseltamivir-
resistant H5N1 strains; it is based on
conventional PCR and takes advan-
tage of the H274Y substitution within
the neuraminidase gene. This simple
technique can be applied in all labora-
tories that lack more advanced and
expensive instruments; thus, it pro-
vides a valuable tool for managing and
preventing influenza A H5N1 out-
breaks. Concerning the spread of
mutant viruses, however, the fitness of
the viruses needs further investigation.
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Figure. A) Representative result from conventional PCR that used H274r primer for
oseltamivir-sensitive and Y274r primer for oseltamivir-resistant detection in samples iso-
lated from human plasma (P), tiger (T), and Vietnamese patient (V). Plasmids containing
N1 fragments obtained from PCR-based mutagenesis for wild-type H274 (Wt) and mutant
Y274 (Mt) were used as positive controls in each reaction. (N, no template control; M, 100-
bp molecular marker.) B) Semiquantitative data on the ability of the assay to detect sub-
populations of the resistant variants. The 2 control plasmids were mixed at wild-type:vari-
ant ratios of 108:102 (lanes 1 and 8), 107:103 (lanes 2 and 9), 106:104 (lanes 3 and 10),
105:105 (lanes 4 and 11), 104:106 (lanes 5 and 12), 103:107 (lanes 6 and 13), and 102:108
(lanes 7 and 14).LETTERS
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Laboratory
Exposure to
Influenza A H2N2,
Germany,
2004–2005 
To the Editor: From November
2004 to February 2005, a company
contracted by the College of
American Pathologists (CAP) sent
influenza quality assurance samples
containing live influenza A H2N2
viruses (A/Japan/305/57) to 3,748
international laboratories (1,2). Of
these, 3,686 (98%) were located in
Canada or the United States. In
Germany, 6 laboratories received at
least 1 of 3 samples, 2 for virus anti-
gen detection and 1 for virus culture;
all contained live virus and were for-
matted identically. No information on
infectivity or virulence of the samples
was available. Because of the absence
of human-to-human influenza A
H2N2 virus transmission since 1968,
this situation provided the rare oppor-
tunity to investigate whether infec-
tions with this strain had occurred in
any of the laboratories.
We used a standardized question-
naire to obtain from the laboratories
information on when the CAP sam-
ples had been received, which of the 3
quality assurance specimens they con-
tained, and how many employees had
been involved in their handling. A
second questionnaire was distributed
to personnel in microbiology and
virology departments. This elicited
information regarding routine labora-
tory activities, contact with CAP sam-
ples, tasks performed in conjunction
with handling of the samples, and any
influenzalike symptoms (sudden
onset of fever, cough, headache, and
muscle pain) within the respective
time frame. Persons who had worked
in a receiving laboratory from
September 1, 2004, to April 15, 2005,
and had performed routine procedures
in virology (defined as transport of
samples, preparation of samples for
diagnostic testing, antigen testing,
nucleic acid amplification testing, and
virus isolation) were eligible for the
study. From May 4 to May 19, 2005,
we visited the laboratories to inter-
view supervisory personnel regarding
routine work-up of samples and to
collect blood from study participants
for serologic testing.
The national reference laboratory
for influenza at Robert Koch Institute
performed serologic testing for anti-
bodies against A/Singapore/1/57
(H2N2) virus by hemagglutination
inhibition. We compared antibody
titers of laboratory workers who
worked with a CAPsample with those
who did not. However, this compari-
son might not show a difference if
(silent) virus transmission had
occurred among laboratory staff. To
exclude this possibility, we also com-
pared titers of workers born before
1969 with those in a group of volun-
teers from Robert Koch Institute also
born before 1969. Titers <10 were
assigned a value of 1.
Of 47 laboratory workers, 18
either declined to participate or were
excluded because they did not per-
form any of the defined routine proce-
dures during the defined period. Thus,
29 (62%) workers were included in
the study, of whom 14 (48%) reported
having worked with CAP samples. Of
these 14 workers, 12 (2 exclusively)
transported samples and 11 (2 exclu-
sively) prepared the samples; 9 (1
exclusively) performed antigen test-
ing, 2 (0) performed nucleic acid
amplification tests and 4 (0) per-
formed virus isolation. Fourteen
workers (48%) reported no contact
with the samples, and 1 (3%) was
unsure. None of the 29 participants
reported any event that could have led
to release of infectious material dur-
ing the respective time frame, such as
broken test tubes or dropped culture
plates. Participating laboratories
reported that all procedures were per-
formed under appropriate hygienic
and safety precautions. No person had
≥3 symptoms typical for influenzalike
illness in the 4 days after having
worked with a CAP sample.
Specific influenza A H2N2 anti-
body titers were determined in 25
study participants. None had a titer
>80, two (8%) had a titer of 80, three
(12%) had titers of 40, two (8%) had
titers of 20, and the remaining 18
(72%) had titers <10. Three (21%) of
14 workers exposed to CAP samples
and 4 (40%) of 10 who denied expo-
sure had titers ≥20. All 7 were born
before 1969. The geometric mean of
titers of all participating workers born
before 1969 did not differ significant-
ly from that of the Robert Koch
Institute employees (p = 0.28; Figure).
In summary, no evidence was
found for laboratory infections with
the influenza A H2N2 virus. The risk
for laboratory-acquired influenza
infections is unknown. Severe acute
respiratory syndrome coronavirus and
Mycobacterium tuberculosis are
infectious agents whose transmission
characteristics are similar to those of
influenza. For severe acute respiratory
syndrome coronavirus, laboratory-
acquired infections are well docu-
mented (3,4). For M.  tuberculosis,
there are strong indications that they
occur (5–7). From a public health per-
spective and in view of the current
importance given to influenza and a
possible pandemic, accurate charac-
terization of the risk for influenza
infections in laboratory settings is
needed. The small number of persons
included in this study limits the
conclusions that can be drawn.
Potentially exposed workers were
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